By Guillermo E. Rosado Haddock
Gottlob Frege is among the maximum logicians ever and likewise a thinker of serious importance. during this publication Rosado Haddock bargains a serious presentation of the most themes of Frege's philosophy, together with, between others, his philosophy of mathematics, his sense-referent contrast, his contrast among functionality and item, and his criticisms of formalism and psychologism. greater than simply an creation to Frege's philosophy this e-book is additionally a hugely serious and mature evaluate of it as a complete during which the restrictions, confusions and different weaknesses of Frege's inspiration are heavily tested. the writer is additionally a Husserlian student and this publication comprises priceless discussions of Husserl's ignored perspectives and comparisons among the 2 nice philosophers.
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Additional resources for A Critical Introduction to the Philosophy of Gottlob Frege
69 Thus, I agree with Frege’s conclusion, which follows immediately, but find his refutation of psychologism in mathematics – and also in logic – not completely compelling. Continuing with Frege, on the basis of the varied difficulties that surround both the psychologistic conception of number as well as the naturalistic discussed above, Frege concludes that numbers are neither spatial and physical nor subjective, like representations. They are at the same time not perceptible by our senses, and objective.
It would, thus, be as incorrect to carry out a psychological investigation of what numbers are as it would be to investigate the Atlantic Ocean by such means. 57 In the argumentation expounded above, Frege is making a distinction, which is crucial for the understanding of his philosophical views, namely, the distinction between what is objective and what is spatial, perceptible, physically real. 58 Thus, for example, says Frege,59 the earth’s axis and the central point of mass in the solar system are objective, but they are not real in the sense in which the earth is real.
Much more important, however, is the fact that this principle – so dear to many followers of Wittgenstein, and not only to them – seems to have been abandoned some years later, probably because it is difficult to reconcile with some Fregean views from 1891 on. But some ideas die hard, and though the Context Principle disappeared from central stage in Frege’s philosophy after 1890, there is still a residue in Grundgesetze der Arithmetik,16 which caused Frege unnecessary problems that he could not satisfactorily solve.